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______________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________________ 
 
 
Rosenn, Circuit Judge. 
 The primary, and in this circuit, novel, issue in this 
appeal is whether civil forfeiture, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§981(a)(1)(C), constitutes punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes, when a court has already sentenced a defendant to 
imprisonment and the payment of restitution.  Paris Francis 
Lundis pled guilty in the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania to one count of unauthorized use 
and possession of credit cards in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§1029(a)(2) & (a)(3).  In addition to a ten month prison sentence 
and three years of supervised release, the court ordered Lundis 
to pay $13,674.50 restitution, the value of several pieces of 
computer equipment fraudulently obtained by Lundis.  Further, the 
court deemed the equipment to be proceeds of Lundis's crime, and 
thus forfeitable to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981 
(a)(1)(C).  The court issued a final order of forfeiture on March 
28, 1995.   
 We conclude that we have jurisdiction and affirm. 
 
I. 
 On September 21, 1994, Lundis pled guilty to Count I of a 
four count indictment charging him with unauthorized use and 
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possession of credit cards in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§1029(a)(2) 
and (a)(3).  Lundis admitted that he stole the cards and used 
them to illegally purchase computers and computer equipment.  The 
trial court sentenced him to ten months imprisonment, and ordered 
that he pay $13,674.50 in restitution to the store where he 
obtained the computers. 
 At the sentencing hearing, Lundis requested that the court 
allow him to keep the property in light of the court's 
requirement that he pay restitution.0  The Government argued that 
the computers were proceeds of Lundis's crime, and thus were 
subject to civil forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §981(a)(1)(C).0  
The court denied Lundis's request for possession of the property, 
stating that the computers were forfeitable "as a matter of law." 
 On December 9, 1994, the Government instituted civil 
forfeiture proceedings in rem against the computers by filing a 
verified complaint for forfeiture.  The Government contends that 
it personally served a warrant of arrest and complaint for 
forfeiture against the computers upon Lundis at the Allegheny 
County Jail on February 1, 1995.  Lundis timely filed a claim to 
                     
0Lundis contends that the computers contain personal material 
such as music scores.  The Government asserts that the computers 
contain information on various stolen credit cards, as well as 
instructions on how to "clone" a cellular phone. 
0Section 981 provides, in pertinent part, for the civil 
forfeiture to the United States of: 
 
(a)(1)(C)  Any property, real or personal, which 
constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a 
violation of Section ... 1029 ... of this title .... 
 
18 U.S.C. § 981. 
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the computers and an answer to the Government's complaint, along 
with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and for appointment of 
counsel. 
 The Government opposed Lundis's request to proceed in forma 
pauperis and his request for counsel.  It also filed a motion to 
dismiss Lundis's claim.  In the motion to dismiss, the Government 
asserted that Lundis's claim to the computers was defective 
because it was not verified as required by Supplemental Rule C(6) 
for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims ("Rule C(6)").  Lundis 
timely filed a response in opposition to the Government's motion 
to dismiss, admitting that his claim was neither verified nor 
properly served, but asserting that the procedural defects were 
due to his pro se and prison status.  The district court 
dismissed Lundis's claim and entered a Judgment and Final Order 
of Forfeiture on March 28, 1995, in favor of the United States. 
 Throughout these proceedings, Lundis filed many documents 
pro se with the district court, including three "Notices of 
Appeal."0  Lundis filed motions for leave to appeal in forma 
pauperis and for appointment of counsel with this court, and this 
court granted the motions.0   
 
II. 
                     
0His first notice attempted to appeal from the district court's 
March 20, 1995 order:  (1) denying Lundis's motion for 
appointment of counsel; (2) denying Lundis's motion to proceed in 
forma pauperis; and (3) dismissing Lundis's claim to the 
computers.  
0This court first dismissed Lundis's appeal for failure to timely 
prosecute, then vacated the dismissal and reinstated the appeal. 
5 
 The Government raises jurisdictional issues contending that 
Lundis has not appealed from the final order of forfeiture.  We 
have plenary review over questions of jurisdiction.  See Anthuis 
v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 971 F.2d 999, 1002 (3rd Cir. 
1992). 
 The district court's dismissal of Lundis's claim to the 
property had the effect of denying him standing, and thus barred 
him from appealing the final forfeiture order.  Without a 
colorable claim to the computers, Lundis lacked standing to 
challenge the forfeiture proceedings.  Thus, as a threshold 
question, we must address whether the court properly denied 
Lundis's pro se motion to intervene in the forfeiture 
proceedings. 
 
A. 
 Rule C(6) requires a claimant to property in a civil 
forfeiture to file a verified claim with the district court.  The 
rule provides, in relevant part: 
(6) Claim and Answer; Interrogatories.  The claimant of 
property that is the subject of an action in rem shall 
file a claim within 10 days after process has been 
executed, or within such additional time as may be 
allowed by the court . . . .  The claim shall be 
verified on oath or solemn affirmation, and shall state 
the interest in the property by virtue of which the 
claimant demands its restitution and the right to 
defend this action. 
 
Supplemental Rule C(6) for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims 
 
(emphasis added). 
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 After the Government initiated forfeiture proceedings, 
Lundis duly filed a "Claim and Cost Bond and Affidavit in forma 
pauperis" in which he asserted that the computer equipment the 
Government confiscated rightfully belonged to him.  This claim 
conformed to the rules in every respect except it lacked a 
verification.    
 The purpose of Rule C(6) is to require claimants to come 
forward as quickly as possible after the initiation of forfeiture 
proceedings, so that the court may hear all interested parties 
and resolve the dispute without delay.  See United States v. 1982 
Yukon Delta Houseboat, 774 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1985).  The 
Rule requires claims to be verified upon oath or solemn 
affirmation to minimize the danger of false claims.  Id.   We 
understand the importance of these goals.  On the facts of this 
case, however, a verification by Lundis, as we note below, would 
have been superfluous.   
 The fundament of Lundis's claim to ownership of the 
computers is his obligation to make restitution to the owners of 
the computer equipment.  This order of restitution came from the 
district court.  Both the court and the Government were aware of 
the source of Lundis's interest in the property and the basis for 
his claim of ownership.  Thus, the verification would not have 
added to the authenticity of Lundis's petition.  We therefore 
believe that it was error under these circumstances to reject 
Lundis's claim merely because of the absence of verification, 
especially in light of Lundis's pro se status and his lack of any 
knowledge of Rule C(6). 
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 With his colorable claim to ownership of the computers, we 
believe that Lundis had standing at least to challenge the 
forfeiture proceedings.  See United States v. Property at 4492 S. 
Livonia Rd., Livonia, 889 F.2d 1258, 1262 (2nd Cir. 1989); see 
also United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d 
1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1987) ("A claimant need not own the 
property in order to have standing to contest its forfeiture; a 
lessor property interest, such as a possessory interest, is 
sufficient for standing.").  We do not believe that we may 
equitably deny Lundis standing where his actions have not 
thwarted the goals of Rule C(6).  See United States v. One Urban 
Lot Located at 1 Street A-1, 885 F.2d 994, 1001 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Property at 4492 S. Livonia, 889 F.2d at 1262; 1982 Yukon Delta 
Houseboat, 774 F.2d at 1436. 
 To dismiss Lundis's claim for failure to include a verified 
statement would "contradict[] both old-fashioned common sense and 
the time-honored admiralty principle that pleadings and 
procedural practices in maritime actions should be applied 
liberally."  One Urban Lot, 885 F.2d at 1001.  Under the 
extraordinary circumstances we have here, an inability to timely 
appeal from the forfeiture of the disputed property because of 
the erroneous denial of standing, we will allow the defendant to 
appeal. 
 
III. 
 Whether the forfeiture of the computers violated the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is an interesting question of law subject to 
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plenary review.  See United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1215 
(3rd Cir. 1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 909 
(1996).   
 Although the Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person 
"subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life 
or limb,"  U.S. Const. amdt. 5, the Supreme Court has explained 
that the Clause "protects against three distinct abuses:  a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple 
punishments for the same offense."  See United States v. Halper, 
490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).  Lundis contends that the district 
court violated the prohibition against multiple punishments by 
first ordering him to pay restitution for the value of the 
computers, and later, in a subsequent forfeiture proceeding, 
allowing forfeiture of the computers to the United States. 
 The relevant inquiry for this court is whether the 
forfeiture procedures under 18 U.S.C. § 981 constitute punishment 
for double jeopardy purposes.  See Halper, 490 U.S. at 441. 
Recent Supreme Court cases note that civil sanctions may 
constitute punishment in certain circumstances.  See Austin v. 
United States, ___U.S.___, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993) (civil 
forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) 
constitute punishment); Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 ("the labels 
'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance" in 
assessing the punitive character of a statute). 
 In Halper, the trial court sentenced the defendant, Irwin 
Halper, to two years imprisonment and fined him $5,000 for 
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violating the criminal false claims statute, 18 U.S.C. § 287.   
The Government later proceeded against Halper under the civil 
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731.  The provisions of the 
civil Act provided for a penalty of $2,000 for each violation of 
the Act.  Halper had violated the Act 65 times, and thus the 
Government contended he was subject to a penalty of more than 
$130,000.  Halper, 490 U.S. at 438-39. 
 The district court in Halper refused to impose the full 
$130,000 penalty, finding that the full penalty would violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause in light of Halper's previous criminal 
punishment.  The district court determined that the penalty would 
constitute punishment unless it served a remedial purpose. 
Sanctions serving a remedial purpose make the Government whole 
for such costs as detection, investigation and prosecution of a 
criminal.  See id. at 445, 449.  The court in Halper found that 
the amount of the penalty was "entirely unrelated" and bore no 
"rational relation" to the actual damages incurred by the 
Government.  Thus, it held that the $130,000 penalty would 
"punish" Halper a second time in violation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  The Supreme Court agreed.  It noted that punishment 
serves the "twin aims of retribution and deterrence," and 
explained: 
[I]t follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly 
be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather 
can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we 
have come to understand the term. . . . We therefore 
hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant 
who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution 
may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to 
the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be 
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characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or 
retribution. 
 
Id. at 448-49.0 
 In Austin, 113 S.Ct. 2901, the Court applied the Halper 
analysis to the forfeiture provisions of 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) 
and (a)(7), and found that those provisions constituted 
punishment for purposes of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines 
Clause.0  The Court noted that, historically, forfeiture was 
understood to be a punishment.  Further, the Court found that the 
statute's emphasis on the culpability of the party indicated a 
congressional intent to punish.  The Court concluded that 
forfeiture provisions deemed to be partially or entirely punitive 
in nature constitute punishment. Id. at 2811-12. 
 It is important to note that Austin involved forfeiture 
proceedings pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).  These 
                     
0The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine "the 
size of the civil sanction the Government may receive without 
crossing the line between remedy and punishment."  Id. at 450.  
021 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) provide, in relevant part: 
 
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the 
United States and no property right shall exist in them: 
 
(4)  All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or 
vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to 
transport, or in any manner to facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or 
concealment or [controlled substances]. 
 
       .                .                . 
 
(7)  All real property . . . which is used, or intended 
to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to 
facilitate the commission of, a violation of this 
subchapter . . . .  
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statutes involve property that facilitates illegal activity, and 
thus run the danger of commanding forfeiture of items that bear a 
disproportionate relationship to the government's costs.0  See 
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.14 ("The value of the conveyances 
and real property forfeitable under §§ 881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) . . 
. can vary so dramatically that any relation between the 
Government's actual costs and the amount of the sanction is 
merely coincidental.").  We believe these statutes may be 
distinguished from the statute implicated in the instant case, 18 
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C).  In Section 981(a)(1)(C), the forfeitable 
property is limited to proceeds of the crime.  At least two 
courts of appeals have distinguished the Supreme Court's decision 
in Austin as inapplicable to cases where the only property the 
government seizes are direct proceeds of an illegal act.  See 
United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 553 (6th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 300 (5th Cir. 1994), reh'g 
denied, 22 F.3d 1096 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 
115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).   
 Tilley involved, inter alia, a challenge to the forfeiture 
provisions of 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6) and (a)(7).0  The defendants 
sought dismissal of their criminal indictment for selling drugs, 
                     
0For example, the Government invokes these statutes to confiscate 
automobiles or real estate that a party may have used as a base 
to make a drug sale. 
0Section 881(a)(6) provides for the forfeiture of all moneys, 
securities, etc. furnished in exchange for a controlled 
substance, or used to facilitate a violation of the drug laws.  
Section 881(a)(7), as discussed in footnote 8, provides for the 
forfeiture of real property.  The court in Tilley deemed all the 
property forfeited to be proceeds of the defendants' crime.  See 
Tilley, 18 F.3d at 297 n. 2. 
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arguing that the prior civil forfeiture of the proceeds of the 
drug sales constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes.  
The Fifth Circuit court of appeals found that the forfeited 
property constituted unlawful proceeds to be a crucial factor in 
its analysis.  Id. at 298.  It noted that, unlike the fines 
imposed in Halper, the forfeiture of proceeds bore a rational 
relationship to the costs to the government and society of the 
illegal act.  Id. at 299.  The Tilley court found the Supreme 
Court's decision in Austin inapplicable.  It noted that Austin 
dealt with forfeitures under Sections 881(a)(4) (conveyances) and 
(a)(7) (real estate), and that, unlike proceeds of a crime, these 
provisions may have no proportional relationship to the costs to 
the government.  The court explained: 
[A] forfeiture proceeding may constitute punishment 
because it involves the extraction of lawfully derived 
property from the forfeiting party. . . . When, 
however, the property taken by the government was not 
derived from lawful activities, the forfeiting party 
loses nothing to which the law ever entitled him. . . . 
[T]he forfeiture . . . does not punish the defendant 
because it exacts no price in liberty or lawfully 
derived property from him.  The possessor of proceeds 
from illegal drug sales never invested honest labor or 
other lawfully derived property to obtain the 
subsequently forfeited proceeds.  Consequently, he has 
no reasonable expectation that the law will protect, 
condone, or even allow, his continued possession of 
such proceeds because they have their very genesis in 
illegal activity. 
                         .           .         . 
 
Consequently, instead of punishing the forfeiting 
party, the forfeiture of illegal proceeds, much like 
the confiscation of stolen money from a bank robber, 
merely places that party in the lawfully protected 
financial status quo that he enjoyed prior to launching 
his illegal scheme.  This is not punishment "within the 
plain meaning of the word." 
 
13 
Id. at 300 (citations omitted). 
  
 We have already adopted Tilley's rationale as the 
controlling law of this circuit for civil forfeiture of proceeds 
under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).  See United States v. $184,505.01 in 
United States Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1168-69 (3rd Cir. 1995) 
("We find the Fifth Circuit's reasoning [in Tilley] to be sound. 
We therefore hold that the forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) 
of proceeds from illegal drug transactions, or proceeds traceable 
to such transactions, does not constitute "punishment" within the 
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.").  Following $184,505.01, 
we find Tilley equally persuasive for civil forfeitures under 18 
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C). 
 We see no reason why our holding in $184,505.01 is not 
controlling.0  First, the statute at issue in this case and the 
statute at issue in $184,505.01 are parallel.  Although the two 
forfeiture provisions use different language, we read them to 
mean the same thing.  Both provide for forfeiture of proceeds. 
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (providing for forfeiture of any 
                     
0At oral argument, counsel for appellant attempted to distinguish 
$184,505.01 by saying it dealt only with administrative 
forfeiture.  This is plainly incorrect.  Although the Government 
initially brought an administrative forfeiture proceeding against 
$14,000 and certain other property, it later converted that 
proceeding to a judicial forfeiture action.  See 72 F.3d at 1162-
63 ("The DEA began separate administrative forfeiture proceedings 
. . . [then] referred the forfeitures to the United States 
Attorney, who filed complaints for civil forfeiture").  The 
forfeiture action against the $184,505.01 that formed the basis 
for our double jeopardy rulings was at all times a judicial 
forfeiture.  See id. at 1162 n.5 ("The DEA referred the 
forfeiture of the $184K to the United States Attorney for 
judicial forfeiture, because its value exceeded $100,000, the 
maximum allowable amount for the . . . administrative forfeiture 
process."). 
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property "which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable 
to a violation of Section . . . 1029 . . . of this title . . . . 
") with 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) (providing for forfeiture of all 
moneys "furnished in exchange for a controlled substance"). 
Because our decision in $184,505.01 dealt specifically with 
forfeiture of proceeds under § 881(a)(6), the additional language 
in that provision dealing with forfeiture of money "used to 
facilitate a violation of the drug laws" is of no moment.  That 
this case involves a different statute is not enough to 
distinguish $184,505.01. 
 Second, when viewed in terms of the reasoning in Tilley, 
the relationship between the forfeited property and the 
underlying offense in this case is identical to that found in 
$184,505.01.  Just like the proceeds of drug trafficking, the 
proceeds of credit card fraud vary directly with the severity of 
the crime:  The more items purchased with stolen credit cards, 
the more property that will ultimately be forfeited to the 
government.  See $184,505.01, 72 F.3d at 1168 ("[T]he forfeiture 
of drug proceeds will always be directly proportional to the 
amount of drugs sold.  The more drugs sold, the more proceeds 
that will be forfeited." (quoting Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300)).  The 
involvement in this case of a different underlying offense is 
therefore unimportant. 
 Finally, our reasoning in $184,505.01 applies even if 
Lundis has already paid an amount of restitution equal to the 
value of the stolen computers.  We noted in $184,505.01 that two 
rationales were at work in Tilley, first that the forfeited 
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amounts were directly proportional to the severity of the crime, 
and second that forfeiture was not punishment because of the very 
nature of illegally derived property.  Id. at 1168.  Post-
restitution forfeiture comports with both.  Under the first, 
paying restitution plus forfeiture at worst forces the offender 
to disgorge a total amount equal to twice the value of the 
proceeds of the crime.  Given the many tangible and intangible 
costs of criminal activity, this is in no way disproportionate to 
"the harm inflicted upon government and society by the 
[offense]."  Tilley, 18 F.3d at 300.  Under the second rationale, 
payment of restitution in no way alters the status of the 
property as ill-gotten gains.  Restitution operates to make the 
victim of the crime whole, not to confer legal ownership on the 
offender of the stolen property.  As a result, Lundis's payment 
of restitution prior to forfeiture makes no difference in our 
double jeopardy analysis. 
 Following $184,505.01, we hold that forfeiture of proceeds 
under § 981(a)(1)(C) is not punishment.  In reaching this 
outcome, we remain aware of contrary authority.  Lundis urges us 
to follow the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's ruling in 
United States v. $405,089.23 United States Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 
(9th Cir. 1994), reh'g denied and modified on other grounds, 56 
F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 
762 (1996), which held that civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. 
§981(a)(1)(A) and 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) constitute punishment 
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.  See also United States v. 
9844 S. Titan Court, 75 F.3d 1470 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting 
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reasoning of Tilley and $184,505.01, following $405,089.23).  In 
$184,505.01, "we reject[ed] the contrary reasoning and 
conclusions of the Ninth Circuit regarding § 881(a)(6)."  72 F.3d 
at 1169.  With nothing to distinguish this case from $184,505.01, 
we again reject the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in regards to 
§981(a)(1)(C).0 
 Given this interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), it 
follows that Lundis's forfeiture of his computer equipment did 
not constitute punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  The district court committed no error in rejecting 
Lundis's double jeopardy claim. 
 
B. 
 Lundis also asserts that the forfeiture of the computers 
violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
Constitutional interpretations are questions of law subject to 
plenary review.  See Epstein Family Partnership, 13 F.3d 762, 766 
(3rd Cir. 1994). 
 The Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, excessive 
fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.  Lundis may only succeed 
in challenging the forfeiture as a violation of the Excessive 
Fines Clause if the forfeiture provision constitutes a 
                     
0Indeed, our rejection of $405,089.23 seems even more warranted 
here:  As discussed above, § 981(a)(1)(C) is a pure proceeds 
statute.  By contrast, § 981(a)(1)(A) covers property "involved 
in" an offense, and § 881(a)(6) covers both proceeds and money 
"used to facilitate" an offense.  To the extent that our holding 
rests on the unique status of proceeds, its logic applies most 
strongly to § 981(a)(1)(C). 
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"punishment."  See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804.  The computers 
forfeited pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) were proceeds of 
Lundis's criminal activity.  As discussed above, the forfeiture 
provision in the instant case does not constitute "punishment." 
Thus, Lundis's Excessive Fines claim has no merit. 
 
IV. 
 In sum, we hold that the district court improperly 
dismissed Lundis's claim to the property subject to forfeiture. 
Although his claim did not contain a verification of ownership, 
under the facts of this case, Lundis presented a colorable claim 
to the property to grant this court jurisdiction. 
 On the merits, we hold that the forfeiture of the 
computers, which were proceeds of Lundis's crime, and to which he 
had no legal rights of ownership, did not constitute punishment. 
Thus, the forfeiture did not violate the Double Jeopardy or 
Excessive Fines Clauses. 
 Accordingly, the order of forfeiture of the district court 
will be affirmed. 
    
  
    
  
